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Abstract 
Patients should not always receive hard data about the risks and benefits of a medical 
intervention. That information should always be available to patients who expressly ask for it, 
but it should be part of standard disclosure only sometimes, and only for some patients. And 
even then, we need to think about how to offer it. 
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Questioning the Quantitative Imperative: Decision Aids, Prevention, and the Ethics of 
Disclosure 
It is easy to see why many experts recommend that patients be given quantitative information 
about the risks and benefits of a test or treatment they are considering, especially when it serves a 
preventive function. The value of prevention, after all, is based on its ability to reduce the risk 
posed by some disease or condition, and the magnitude of this risk reduction can be stated 
precisely only by using numbers. Many experts conclude that such data, when available, should 
be disclosed to patients to help them make an informed decision. Advocates of the "quantitative 
imperative," as I call it, often appeal to ethical principles related to informed consent or shared 
decision-making or, at a deeper level, to the goal of respecting patient autonomy.1  
The quantitative imperative is perhaps most prominent in discussions of "decision aids," which 
are pamphlets, videos, or computer programs designed to inform patients about their options and 
help them make better choices.2 While decision aids are not yet a standard part of medical care, 
they are being created, tested, and recommended for a wide range of medical decisions, and they 
can present much more information than a health care practitioner can convey during a typical 
patient visit.3 The International Patient Decision Aids Standards, the most widely accepted 
guidelines for the design and evaluation of decision aids, recommend that all patients considering 
preventive interventions be given information about the baseline risk of the disease in question, 
the specific magnitude of risk reduction offered by the preventive service, and the probability of 
negative outcomes.4  
Even though the ethical reasoning that generates the quantitative imperative appears plausible, I 
will argue here that there are important problems with it stemming from the way people 
understand and respond to numerical and graphical information. Many individuals have 
significant problems comprehending or applying probabilistic and mathematical concepts, 
reflecting widespread limitations in "numeracy."5 Furthermore, research in psychology and other 
fields has established the existence of "heuristics" and "biases" in human thought that hinder the 
rational processing of quantitative information, even by people who are relatively "numerate."6  
These findings, I argue, show that health care providers should not always disclose the kind of 
data recommended by the quantitative imperative. Instead, quantitative information will be 
appropriate for some situations and some patients, but not for others. And while the data should 
always be available to patients who want it, the question is how to offer it and in what form. 
These issues suggest that much more empirical research and ethical analysis is required about the 
use of quantitative information in decision-making. 
Prevention and the Use of Decision Aids 
Decisions about screening tests or preventive treatments are seldom easy. Consider a forty-year 
old woman deciding whether to start having mammograms to screen for breast cancer. In 
November 2009, the United States Preventive Services Task Force issued guidelines stating that: 
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The USPSTF recommends against routine screening mammography in women aged 40 to 49 
years. The decision to start regular, biennial screening mammography before the age of 50 years 
should be an individual one and take patient context into account, including the patient's values 
regarding specific benefits and harms.7  
In these guidelines, the USPSTF withdrew its previous recommendation that all women in this 
age group should undergo mammography, a change that led to public outcry. That controversy 
will not be discussed here, but it is helpful to consider the type of trade-offs that the USPSTF 
highlighted in making this change. Most importantly, while mammograms for women aged forty 
to forty-nine identify some tumors and slightly reduce mortality from breast cancer, they also 
result in a significant number of false positives and unnecessary biopsies.8 They can lead to 
"overtreatment" of some women, as well—that is, treatment for cancers that would otherwise 
never have caused a problem or perhaps even been recognized.9 Thus, whether one agrees with 
the USPSTF's guidelines or not, everyone agrees that a woman's decision to get mammograms 
while she is in this age range involves important trade-offs. 
Decisions of this sort are "preference sensitive," since the right choice depends on the 
individual's beliefs and values.10 For patients facing this sort of decision, it is especially 
important for them to receive full information and support if they are to make a truly informed 
choice. Many experts believe that this makes decision aids essential.11  
The apparent need for decision aids stems partly from a recognition that patients talking to health 
care providers often do not get full information about all their options.12 This failure is due to 
many factors, including a simple lack of time during busy doctor-patient visits.13 Decision aids 
aim to counteract this by providing additional information and assistance, usually outside of the 
visit. Decision aids have been created in many formats, ranging from printed to audiovisual or 
computer-based, and for decisions ranging from prostate cancer screening to treatment of atrial 
fibrillation and the use of estrogen by postmenopausal women.14 In fact, although decision aids 
are still not typically included in clinical care, more than five hundred have been created, and 
there have been more than fifty-five randomized controlled trials studying their impact.15 Some 
believe that we are nearing a "tipping point" and that decision aids will soon be much more 
common in clinical care.16  
A recent review concludes that compared to usual care, decision aids increase patient knowledge 
and the feeling of being informed while decreasing indecision and passivity.17 The International 
Patient Decision Aids Standards—published in 2006 and based on work by an international 
group of more than one hundred experts and other stakeholders18 —are now widely accepted and 
implemented.19 
Although there are no decision aids focused on the question whether to get mammograms from 
ages forty to forty-nine, this is exactly the sort of decision for which they are supposed to be 
helpful. A decision aid on this topic would inform women about the benefits and risks and would 
encourage them to carefully consider the trade-offs involved. 
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It is easy to see why the quantitative information seems important in cases such as this. If 
numbers are not given, then a woman of this age considering whether to get mammograms might 
be told only that the screening will reduce her risk of dying of breast cancer "somewhat" or "by a 
small amount" (or some such), and that it will lead to a "significant" chance or "some" chance (or 
some such) of false positives and unnecessary biopsies or overtreatment. But all these terms are 
vague, and research has shown that such verbal descriptions—terms like "commonly," "rarely," 
"significantly," etc.—are interpreted in widely varying ways by patients and doctors.20  
In contrast, giving the numbers allows a much more precise description of the risks and benefits. 
Here are the relevant numbers for getting biennial mammograms from age forty to forty-nine, 
according to a recent model.21 Imagine a group of 1,300 women who are forty years old and have 
average risk for breast cancer. If none of them ever get a screening mammogram in their entire 
lives, then about forty-nine of them will die of breast cancer. If they all get biennial 
mammograms starting at age fifty and continuing to sixty-nine, just forty-two will die. And if 
they start getting mammograms at age forty instead of fifty, and continue until age sixty-nine, the 
number who will die drops to forty-one.22 In sum, the decision by 1,300 women to start getting 
mammograms at age forty rather than fifty saves one woman from dying of breast cancer. The 
model can also quantify the benefit as number of life-years gained: the group of 1,300 women 
that starts screening at forty will have twenty-seven additional life years, compared to the group 
that starts at fifty (which averages out to roughly 7.5 days per woman). 
The prevalence of negative outcomes can also be quantified. For the 1,300 women who start 
screening at age forty rather than fifty, there will be a total of about six hundred more "false 
positives" and fifty unnecessary biopsies.23 (These are defined in the model as a repeat 
mammogram or a biopsy performed when there is no cancer present). It is very hard to calculate 
reliable figures for the degree of "overtreatment," but according to some estimates, in this group 
of 1,300 women, two to four will be diagnosed with cancer who, without the extended screening, 
would never have known they had it.24  
This type of quantitative information—comparing the frequency of outcomes in two populations, 
one that undergoes the intervention and one that does not—is called "natural frequencies," and it 
can be presented with numbers, as above, or with charts or figures.25 For instance, an "icon chart" 
might depict 1,300 faces, filled in with different colors to indicate the number of individuals in 
the screened and unscreened groups who will experience each possible outcome.26 This would 
represent both the benefits and the risks of mammography. 
The Quantitative Imperative 
The case in favor of making these numbers a necessary part of disclosure is so transparent that 
commentators often offer little reason for it. Many simply assert that disclosure will help patients 
make better informed decisions.27 Robert McNutt writes, "Numbers alone may fall short of being 
a language for decision making, but are a necessary place to start."28 Some go a little deeper, 
asserting that quantitative information is necessary to respect patient autonomy.29 Proponents of 
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providing quantitative information must appeal to ethics, since there is little empirical support for 
their position. While some studies show that giving patients quantitative information improves 
their accuracy in describing the probability of risks and benefits, very little research has 
demonstrated that it has a clearly positive impact on decision-making or medical outcomes.30  
But the ethical arguments for the "quantitative imperative" have nonetheless carried the day in 
many quarters. The United Kingdom's General Medical Council, for instance, asserts that all 
patients considering screening should be told "the likelihood of positive/ negative findings and 
possibility of false positive/negative results."31 And as mentioned, the quantitative imperative has 
driven the development and implementation of decision aids. The widely accepted IPDAS 
guidelines, for instance, recommend that decision aids: 
• disclose the specific chances of all positive and negative outcomes from a proposed 
medical test or treatment, 
• use "event rates in a defined group of patients for a specific time," and 
• describe the chance of various outcomes in the treated (or screened) group and the 
untreated (or unscreened) group "using the same denominator" and "over the same period 
of time."32  
For screening tests, the IPDAS guidelines assert, the decision aid should disclose the probability 
of a patient receiving a "true positive, true negative, false positive and false negative test result," 
as well as the "chance of disease being found with and without screening."33  
Framing Considerations 
As can be seen from these recommendations, the quantitative imperative does not just 
recommend that decision aids should give quantitative information, but that they should frame 
that information in specific ways. In particular, the quantitative imperative generally mandates 
the use of measures that convey "absolute" probabilities or frequencies, such as in the natural 
frequency presentations above; that is, measures should provide information about the entire 
population rather than subgroups.34 Also satisfying this criterion are descriptions of "absolute 
risk reduction" (ARR), which state the difference in risk with the intervention versus without it. 
For instance, the ARR of getting mammography from ages fifty to sixty-nine is calculated by 
subtracting the mortality rate after mammography (3.23 percent) from the rate without it (3.77 
percent), resulting in an ARR of 0.54 percent (5.4 per 1,000). Choosing to start getting 
mammograms at age forty rather than fifty produces an additional ARR of 0.07 percent (0.7 per 
1,000) (3.16 percent versus 3.23 percent). Another popular absolute measure of benefit is 
"number needed to screen" (NNS), reflected in the comment above that 1,300 women must 
choose to undergo mammography starting at age forty rather than fifty to save one woman from 
dying of breast cancer. NNS is identical to the concept of "number needed to treat" (NNT), used 
to discuss the efficacy of treatment, and mathematically both NNS and NNT are equivalent to the 
inverse of ARR. 
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Advocates of the quantitative imperative generally endorse use of natural frequencies, ARR, and 
NNS/T, but they reject other measures, such as "relative risk reduction" (RRR), which is 
calculated by dividing the ARR by the baseline risk. The RRR of getting mammograms 
biennially from ages fifty to sixty-nine, compared to no screening, is 15 percent (calculated by 
dividing 0.54 by 3.77).35 Getting mammograms biennially from ages forty to sixty-nine increases 
the RRR to 16 percent (0.61/3.77).36  
The rejection of RRR is understandable, since this measure clearly leaves out crucial 
information. In an extreme case, for instance, patients may be very impressed when told that a 
treatment for some disease reduces mortality by a RRR of 50 percent, but much less impressed if 
told that the treatment reduces risk from two in one million to one in one million: that's an ARR 
of one in one million, a NNT of one million, and a RRR of 50 percent. Research has shown that 
people told the RRR of a hypothetical screening test or treatment are more likely to say that they 
would accept it than when they are told the ARR or NNS/T.37 John-Arne Skolbekken argues that 
patients and doctors too often hear just that lowering cholesterol with statin medications can 
reduce cardiac mortality by 21 percent, the RRR, rather than being told that the ARR is 0.5 
percent and the NNT is 200.38 Hazel Thornton and coauthors argue that women considering 
mammography should be told the ARR or the NNS, not just the RRR.39  
Rejecting the RRR has widespread consequences. Much of the information available in health 
pamphlets or on the Internet about preventive measures such as mammography provides no 
quantitative measure of benefit at all, but when numbers are given, the RRR is the preferred 
measure.40  
One more aspect of framing as it relates to the quantitative imperative bears comment as well. 
While getting mammograms from age fifty to sixty-nine can be described as reducing the 
probability of dying of breast cancer from 3.77 percent to 3.23 percent, it can also be described 
as raising the chance of not dying of breast cancer from 96.23 percent to 96.77 percent. The first 
description is called "positive framing," since it is the probability of an event occurring (dying of 
breast cancer), and the latter is "negative framing."41 And research shows that risk reduction 
framed positively has a larger effect on individuals than when it is framed negatively, partly 
since positive framing often involves a larger relative percent change (in this case 3.23 vs. 3.77 
percent, rather than 96.23 percent vs. 96.77 percent).42 Noting this differential effect, IPDAS 
recommends that decision aids should present quantitative information both positively and 
negatively, to avoid biasing individuals one way or the other.43  
Numeracy and the Reasonable Person Standard 
But the ethical case for the quantitative imperative is deeply flawed. The first major challenge 
stems from evidence that many people have trouble understanding quantitative information. 
National surveys suggest that at least 22 percent of adults have only the most basic quantitative 
skills, such as counting, while another 33 percent possess only slightly more advanced skills, 
such as performing simple arithmetic.44 This means that more than half of adults do not have the 
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ability to comprehend and utilize the key mathematical concepts used in quantifying risk and 
benefit—probability, percentage, and frequency. 
Further studies reveal even more widespread difficulties with mathematical concepts. On tests 
measuring understanding of the basic facts of probability, more than 80 percent of individuals 
miss at least one question.45 These findings have been replicated in populations with relatively 
high levels of education, including a group in which more than 80 percent graduated from 
college.46 In this highly educated group, fully 16 to 20 percent of subjects could not answer the 
most straightforward questions, such as whether 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent represents the 
larger risk.47  
In another study, when patients in a general medical clinic were given information about the 
absolute benefit of two hypothetical preventive treatments in terms of ARR or NNT, just 42 
percent and 30 percent, respectively, were able to correctly identify the more effective 
treatment.48 When the benefit was described in terms of RRR, 60 percent completed the task 
successfully, and when patients were presented with the data framed in more than one way, the 
success rate dropped. (This raises questions about the IPDAS recommendation that decision aids 
should employ both positive and negative framing.) 
Some experts have recommended the use of figures or graphs as a way to convey mathematical 
or probabilistic information to individuals who have limited numeracy.49 But although such 
approaches may be useful, they are no cure-all. People with limited numeracy have significant 
problems interpreting figures and graphs, especially ones that convey information about absolute 
risk and benefit.50 In a recent study, patients with low numeracy who were given relatively 
simple graphic representations of risk levels were unable to distinguish which was higher and 
which was lower.51 It appears that patients may prefer and better understand charts and figures 
that represent data in terms of relative risk, but this is exactly the sort of data that the quantitative 
imperative rejects as being inadequate for full disclosure. 
One way to understand the challenge that innumeracy poses is to consider the quantitative 
imperative in relation to the "reasonable person standard," one of the most commonly used 
guides for what information should be included in minimal disclosure.52 This standard asserts 
that "the information to be disclosed should be determined by reference to a hypothetical 
reasonable person. Whether information is pertinent or material is to be measured by the 
significance a reasonable person would attach to it in deciding whether to undergo a 
procedure."53 The quantitative imperative can be seen as claiming that a reasonable person would 
find data stated in terms of natural frequencies, ARR, or NNS/T as being significant for medical 
decisions, especially in the area of prevention. 
But widespread innumeracy draws this claim into question. In particular, if the abilities of the 
hypothetical "reasonable person" are similar to those of a typical member of the population, it 
follows that he should not be assumed to understand probabilities and frequencies. And in this 
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case, we might assume that the reasonable person would not find quantitative information 
significant. 
Perhaps a defender of the quantitative imperative could claim that the reasonable person should 
be assumed to have higher numeracy than the average person, but this raises further problems. If 
the average person is not the basis for describing the "reasonable person," then what criteria 
should be used? And it seems odd to say that the reasonable person standard results in disclosing 
information that will not be understood by most people. 
Many advocates of the quantitative imperative are aware of the problem of innumeracy, and 
some have conducted important research studying it.54 These experts appear to see innumeracy 
mainly as a challenge to find better ways to convey and explain data to patients with limited 
numeracy, and some research in risk communication focuses on this goal. For instance, studies 
have examined whether natural frequencies, especially presented using graphics, may help 
overcome innumeracy.55  
It is possible, though, that there will be persistent limitations in how much quantitative 
information can be effectively communicated to people with limited numeracy. There might be 
unavoidable trade-offs between the completeness of the information presented and the degree to 
which patients understand it. As mentioned above, studies have shown that patients understand 
and apply RRR data more easily than absolute measures such as ARR or NNT, whether 
presented as numbers or in graphs.56  
An advocate of the quantitative imperative could respond to criticism based on the prevalence of 
innumeracy by arguing that innumeracy is a general social problem that should be combated, not 
accepted. From this perspective, if people cannot understand quantitative information that is a 
necessary part of informed consent, then the health care system should engage in outreach and 
education to overcome this problem in health literacy (as well as others). But this sort of 
proposal must confront questions about whether it is a feasible undertaking for a system already 
struggling to control costs and provide care to all. The project would have to be evaluated in 
comparison with other possible projects of outreach and public education, which raises questions 
about how to even measure the value. Any claim of benefit would have to be based, at least 
largely, on evidence that it helps patients with low numeracy make better decisions about health 
care, but such research is in its infancy: while one study has shown that a short course in 
quantitative reasoning can improve patients' facility with statistics, that study did not measure 
decision quality at all.57 
Irrational Responses to Quantitative Information 
Another reason to wonder about the possible benefit of combating innumeracy is that even 
numerate individuals have persistently irrational responses to quantitative information about risk 
and benefit. In order to understand human responses to quantitative measures of risk and benefit, 
it is necessary to quickly review a leading theory of rationality called "expected utility theory." 
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The essential idea can be summarized as follows. If an individual is choosing between action A 
and action B, the rationally preferable choice is the one that can be expected to lead to higher 
utility for him or her, where utility is understood as some measure of the goodness and badness 
of the resulting situations. If an action can lead to a range of possible outcomes, then the 
expected utility for that action is the sum of the utility of each possible outcome, weighted by the 
probability of its occurring.58  
This quick description of expected utility theory suggests a possible argument for the 
quantitative imperative that has never been explicitly stated by advocates. An individual can 
calculate the expected utility of some decision—such as getting mammograms starting at age 
forty, for instance—only if she knows the probability of the different outcomes. While a 
presentation of natural frequency data, as above, provides this data, neither a verbal description 
nor an estimate of RRR does. Therefore, providing absolute measures of benefit and risk is 
necessary for making rational decisions. Interestingly, unlike the argument based on the 
reasonable person standard, this one is not weakened by the prevalence of innumeracy. From the 
perspective of expected utility theory, innumerate individuals need education to allow them to 
make the necessary calculations, so they can make rational decisions. 
But once the argument for the quantitative imperative is understood in this way, it is open to 
important criticisms based on research into human reasoning. Research in psychology and other 
fields has shown that giving individuals quantitative data about risk and benefit often leads to 
irrational decisions—that is, to decisions that fail to maximize expected utility. For example, in 
seminal experiments, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky demonstrated that when individuals 
are told about the low probability of a certain event, especially a possible loss, they are likely to 
give that event excessive importance.59 Similarly, due to "denominator neglect" people often give 
exaggerated importance to small risks, such as five deaths per one million cases; they are 
focusing on the deaths (the numerator) rather than the large population in which they occurred 
(the denominator).60  
Researchers have also shown the existence of an opposing tendency termed "optimism bias." For 
example, when told that ten out of one hundred people will develop a certain disease, many 
people exaggerate the chance of their being in the "lucky" group and thus downplay the risk, 
again leading to decisions that violate expected utility theory.61 Which of these biases come into 
play in a given situation—causing the individual to exaggerate or minimize a danger—depends 
on the individual's psychology and the way the information is presented. 
In almost all cases, the setting in which a risk is described and the individual's other beliefs will 
affect the impact. For instance, if women are told their precise risk of developing breast cancer 
over the next ten years (as a percentage or a frequency, let us assume), those who previously 
overestimated their risk will continue to ascribe it elevated importance, compared to those who 
previously underestimated their risk or had no opinion.62 This is due to a process that 
psychologists call "anchoring and adjustment." In addition, if women who previously 
overestimated their risk for breast cancer are asked to state their estimation before being told the 
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actual (lower) number, they feel more reassured by the lower figure than if they were not asked 
to state their estimate beforehand.63  
Findings such as this over the past thirty years have led psychologists to theorize that human 
reasoning involves two separate systems, with one carrying a representation of the specific risk 
(absolute probability, for example) while the other forms a "fuzzy representation," sometimes 
called a "gist."64 While the first system registers the numerical facts—such as that the risk of 
breast cancer is 10 percent—the second constructs a general meaning of this risk, such as 
labeling it as "serious" or "minimal." According to such dual representation models, people's 
opinions of risk and decisions about how to act are based largely on the second system, which 
may result in the biases and heuristics that researchers have found. 
If dual representation theories are correct, then any claim about the benefit of giving quantitative 
information must be supported by evidence that patients who receive such data actually form 
more effective "fuzzy representations," or make better decisions in some sense, than people who 
do not. But as mentioned, research of this sort is so far limited. While some studies show that 
individuals who are given numerical information or view graphs about risk and benefit do better 
on tests that measure understanding of the magnitude of risks and benefit,65 no studies have yet 
shown that better performance on these tests translates into better decisions or improved 
outcomes.66  
Irrational Reasoning with Nonquantitative Information 
At this point, however, it may appear that the line of reasoning leads to unacceptable 
conclusions. Psychology, after all, has found similarly irrational aspects of human reasoning 
concerning nonquantitative information: just as a patient may respond in ways that violate 
expected utility theory when told that the risk of a complication of some lifesaving surgery is one 
in ten thousand, he may also respond irrationally when told just that there is such a rare 
complication, without being given the specific probability.67 Does this mean that patients should 
not be given certain types of nonquantitative information, either—such as the possibility of rare 
complications—unless it is established that the disclosure improves decision-making? 
In response, it is important to note that significant questions have been raised about the 
assumption that all available information (quantitative or nonquantitative) should be given to all 
patients in all situations. Carl Schneider, Onora O'Neill, and others have argued against the trend 
toward maximal disclosure, pointing to empirical findings suggesting that patients do not 
understand this information or integrate it into their decisions.68 While bioethics has largely 
pushed for more disclosure, these authors argue that the desire not to know, or to ask a physician 
to make the decision, may be perfectly rational and reasonable. 
My criticism of the quantitative imperative certainly fits with this wider attack on "mandatory 
autonomy."69 Both critiques argue against the assumption that it is ethically required to ensure 
that all patients understand and utilize all available information, no matter how complex. And 
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even though both critiques reject a picture where patients are required to consider complex data, 
both are compatible with the recommendation that all patients should have the opportunity to 
consider any information they want. While I reject the quantitative imperative, for instance, I 
also disapprove of the current system's failure to make that information available to those who 
want it. 
My critique of the quantitative imperative can be seen as suggesting that disclosure of 
quantitative information should be tailored to individuals rather than to some abstract 
"reasonable person," and thus may be seen as fitting with an alternative to the reasonable person 
standard called the "subjective standard." According to this criterion, each individual must be 
given the information that will fulfill his informational needs, not those of some hypothetical 
reasonable person.70 A serious challenge, of course, is determining an individual's "informational 
needs," both in general and in specific situations. Given widespread limitations in numeracy, the 
subjective standard leads to very different conclusions than the quantitative imperative's 
recommendation that complex quantitative data should be included in minimal disclosure to all. 
Quantitative Information as Optional 
This discussion leaves many questions unanswered, such as how to determine what sort of 
quantitative information, if any, should be included in minimal disclosure about particular tests 
or treatments, and how best to offer additional information to patients. The discussion highlights 
the need to consider such questions and to conduct additional empirical research into the desires 
of patients and the effect of various ways of giving data. 
Seeing quantitative information as optional rather than required is consistent with other writing 
about the presentation of data to patients. For instance, in a review of how clinicians should 
describe clinical evidence, Ronald Epstein and collaborators recommend that health care 
providers should start the discussion by presenting relatively simple information and then 
offering more complicated data, including quantitative information, depending on the patient's 
desires.71 Similarly, the USPSTF recommends a process of shared decision-making that may or 
may not include disclosure of quantitative information, depending on the situation and the 
patient.72 Such approaches have not explicitly confronted the recommendations of the 
quantitative imperative, though, as I do here. 
Also, these approaches have focused on health care practitioners, not decision aids, and they 
often depend on human judgment to determine how much quantitative information should be 
given to a particular patient. In contrast, a decision aid—such as one that is computer-based, for 
instance—must depend on some algorithm for making such determinations. This raises important 
questions about how decision aids should assess what quantitative information individual 
patients want. 
We may reasonably conclude that the correct amount of quantitative information to provide as 
part of standard disclosure, and the way in which additional data is offered, depends not just on 
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the patient's abilities and desires but also on the sort of intervention involved. For more invasive 
or risky procedures, or tests or treatments that have less clearly proven benefits or higher burdens 
and risks, it may be appropriate to present more extensive quantitative information and to 
encourage patients more strenuously to consider it. Such an approach is consistent with a model 
offered by Simon Whitney and collaborators where standards for decision-making vary based on 
the benefit and risk of the intervention, though that model does not explicitly discuss quantitative 
information.73  
Questions about how and when to disclose quantitative information will become ever more 
pressing as advances in epidemiology and genetics provide increasingly precise ways to 
characterize the risks that patients face and the possible impact of preventive treatments.74 
Simply attempting to present all information to all patients, possibly through the use of decision 
aids, could hurt rather than help medical decision-making. Instead, careful thought about the 
proper way to present such information—targeted to individuals' abilities, interests, and 
situations—can make an important contribution to improving prevention and medical care more 
generally. 
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